European countries are economically dependent upon each other. This paper therefore embeds the analysis of the Western Balkan countries within a wider perspective of the European economy as a whole. It combines a simple Core-Periphery model with an underconsumption model to provide a convincing explanation of the emergence of secular stagnation, the dependency relationships between the European economies, and the spillover effects of Eurozone crisis to the Western Balkans. Due to tendencies to under-consumption, the Core countries have been vulnerable to secular stagnation and in order to overcome this tendency within the Eurozone they are dependent on export revenues from the peripheries to sustain their economic growth. This has led to high trade and current account deficits during the boom and placed the peripheries in a highly vulnerable position during the recession period. Financialisation of the European economy has emerged as a response to the tendency towards secular stagnation, as the provision of consumer credit has stimulated demand and temporarily overcome under-consumption tendencies. The paper argues that continuing austerity as a method to create internal devaluation is unlikely to succeed as a means to extricate the periphery countries from the crisis. Given the dependencies of the European economies upon one another, a possibly better way out of the current period of low growth and stagnation would be a coordinated fiscal expansion to stimulate domestic and Europewide demand.
Introduction
The Eurozone crisis can be understood as the outcome of a structural imbalance between "Core" and "Periphery" countries (Lapavitsas et al., 2010) .
Germany is at the centre of "Core" group of countries in the Eurozone, while Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are conventionally seen as forming the "Periphery". Yet other EU member states outside the Eurozone also belong to the European Periphery. Countries of the "Outer Periphery" such as Bulgaria and Romania are just as much affected by the Eurozone crisis as the "Inner Periphery" countries, even though they have not adopted the Euro. The fortunes of their economies are affected by developments in the Eurozone, not just through flows of trade, investment and people, but also because the financial sectors are highly integrated.
Outside the EU, there is a further layer of countries that are neither Eurozone members nor EU members but which are similarly influenced by developments in the EU and the Eurozone. Following Martin Sokol, these countries can be referred to as the "Super Periphery" of the EU (Martin Sokol, 2001) . They comprise the countries of the Western Balkans and of the European Eastern Neighbourhood.
A feature of these countries, especially in the Western Balkans, has been widespread euroisation both among households and companies. This has meant the Western Balkan countries have not been able to use devaluation as a means to improve the competitiveness of their economies. A high proportion of loans and savings are denominated in Euros, which inhibits the use of devaluation or depreciation of the currency as an instrument of macroeconomic policy to improve the external competitiveness of their economies.
At the same time, EU bailouts are unavailable to these countries. Therefore, the only option is internal devaluation, which requires decreased levels of prices and unit labour costs to bring about improved external competitiveness.
In this paper we identify the extent to which these peripheral countries are connected to and influenced by the evolution of the EU economy as a whole, and how they have been consequently affected by the crisis in the Eurozone.
Under-Consumption in the Capitalist Core
The Classical economists were preoccupied with the question whether there would be enough aggregate demand to buy all the goods and services produced by business enterprises. The theme was taken up by Keynes who argued that market economies were prone to a lack of effective demand and to the possibility of unemployment equilibrium (Keynes, 1936) . The underconsumption theorists further more proposed that market economies were also prone to "secular stagnation" (Hansen, 1955; Summers, 2013) . Radical economists took this further, most notably in the work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy who argued that under "monopoly capitalism", employers strive to increase profits by pushing down wages, which reduces aggregate consumption (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) . In a further development of the theory, they argued that the financial sector dominance has emerged as a means to maintain aggregate consumption. However, this has the unfortunate side effect of increasing instability in the economy (Minsky, 1986) . The financialisation thesis suggests that financialisation generates instability and is a prime factor in economic stagnation, and would lead to debt-deflation and prolonged recession (Palley, 2007) . Others have argued that stagnation is more deep-seated phenomenon and that it is the tendency towards stagnation that generates financialisation rather than the other way round, and with the failure of financialisation the underlying tendency towards stagnation reappears (Bellamy Foster and Magdoff, 2009) . Moreover, financialisation has also generated gross inequality (Picketty, 2014) , which further reduces consumption demand and reinforces the under-consumption problem.
Governments of advanced countries have several options for escaping from the under-consumption trap (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) . First they can increase government spending in various forms. Social spending (pensions, social security) can be increased but the limits of this appear when social spending begins to undermine work incentives. The public services such as education and health can be expanded through public expenditure, but the limits of this are reached under continuous pressure to introduce private provision of services. A strong contender for generating additional demand is through military expenditure (in 2013 the US military budget was $640 billion).
However, this also reaches its limits for countries that wish to pursue a peaceful non-aggressive foreign policy. Another way to generate increased demand in economies that suffer from under-consumption is to increase consumption through advertising and marketing expenditure. However, this also has its limits due to the finite needs of the population, although constant efforts are made to stimulate artificial desires.
A further important mechanism to stimulate demand is to rely upon demand from other countries and to promote exports through measures that build a country's competitive advantage. This form of export led growth is usually accompanied by central control over wage costs, combined with labour market reforms to reduce wage costs and promote the flexibility of the labour force.
Many other measures are available to promote exports. Some countries are more successful than others. However, the limit of this approach is that all countries cannot do this at the same time. Some must be net importers if others are to be net exporters. This has been a central feature of the Eurozone arrangement. The Core countries, especially Germany, have become net exporters and rely upon demand from the Periphery counties to compensate for under-consumption on the domestic market.
Finally, additional demand can be generated through the development of consumer credit. If the workers do not have enough buying power from their wages, then they can be encouraged to take out consumer credit to fill the gap.
This has led to the development of a very sophisticated market in consumer finance and to the general 'financialisation' of the advanced economies that generates additional consumption through growth of consumer credit. But financialisation generates asset bubbles and financial crises and so also has its eventual limits.
Secular Stagnation in the Eurozone
The Euro was established in January 2002 as a monetary union without a fiscal union. Under this arrangement, the nominal interest rate set by the ECB is the same across all the member states. Since this common interest rate that is too high in some countries and too low in others, immense structural imbalances have grown over time. In particular, as Germany is a strong exporter, she has run structural current account surpluses, while the peripheral countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy have run structural current account deficits. These deficits have led to a build up of debt in the peripheral countries that has contributed to the economic crisis that has beset the Eurozone since 2009.
In addition, the adoption of the Euro induced investors to believe that the debts contracted by the peripheral countries were just as credit-worthy as the debts incurred by the Core countries such as Germany or the Netherlands. This Since the debts that governments issued were largely held by their own banks in the Periphery countries, the banks also got into difficulties. As the value of the government bonds that they held fell, and they ran into danger of bankruptcy, and the banks had to be bailed out by their own governments leading to a further increase in government deficits. This negative spiral of debt and collapse between the states and the banks became a bottleneck, preventing the resumption of economic growth (Pisany-Ferry, 2014) .
The essence of the problem was that the Eurozone lacked an EU-wide "bank resolution" mechanism. When banks get into difficulties in normal countries, their own central banks have the ability to step in and bail them out (or recapitalise them) if needed, and can subject such banks to reorganisations and other regulatory procedures, or close them down. In the Eurozone there was no single authority that had the power to step in and close down a bank in difficulty, or bail them out, relieving the bank's own state of the responsibility.
Eventually, policy makers realised the need for a banking union to accompany the monetary union that would create a single authority to carry out these responsibilities. These institutions have now been established, as the European Banking Authority based in London and the increased power to the ECB to act as a banking supervisor with powers to "resolve" local banks in trouble in Eurozone member states.
The policies that have been adopted to restore balance in the Eurozone have been generalised austerity and cut backs in state spending, combined with increases in taxation. A stability treaty was signed to restrict the government deficits of the Eurozone member states to 3% of their GDP. In order to achieve these targets public expenditure has been cut, further deepening recession and stagnation in the Eurozone. In order to restore the competitiveness of the economies of the Periphery, internal devaluations have been imposed in an effort to reduce real wages and prices of exported goods. The strong inflow of foreign capital led to falling interest rates and rapid credit growth. Since the onset of the crisis, Eurozone banks have tried to build up their domestic capital and are "deleveraging" from the Western Balkans.
Through the Vienna Agreement, the IFIs provide €24.5bn loans to 17 parent banks of banks in Central and South East Europe. Later, the "Vienna Plus" agreement aimed to encourage substitution of foreign borrowing by local currency borrowing and more efficient absorption of EU structural funds.
Eurozone Crisis and the Peripheries of Europe
The Inner Periphery of the Eurozone has experienced a dramatic economic recession that has been widely commented and analysed (Cristodoulakis et al. 2011 ). The Outer Periphery has also suffered from the spillover effects of the Eurozone crisis (Beleva, 2011) .
The Western Balkan countries were severely hit by the global financial crisis and subsequently by the Eurozone crisis after 2008 experiencing a double-dip recession and virtual stagnation (Bartlett and Prica, 2013) . Initially there was a very strong reduction in export demand, though this picked up in 2013. There was also a remarkable collapse in credit growth, a reduction in FDI inflows and a fall in remittance inflows. The fall in demand for the output of companies due to the recession, and to governments' tactics of delaying payments in order to meet budget deficit targets, has caused companies difficulties paying back the loans they took out during the boom period. This in turn has led to a huge increase in non-performing loans. Source: Eurostat online data on unemployment rate for 15-74 year olds, data codes [lfsq_urgan] and [cpc_siemp] Prior to the crisis, the international debt had been relatively modest, but since the onset of the crisis, international debt has increased in the Western Balkans from an average of 47% of GDP in 2008 to 63% of GDP in 2012. 
Where β0 represents autonomous growth capacity β1 represents dependency on EU growth β2 represents the effect of the crisis on autonomous growth
The data used to analyse the model is taken from EUROSTAT. Available data on annual real GDP growth rates for the EU countries and the enlargement countries span the years from 1996-2014 (N=19). While this is a small sample, it is nevertheless a consistent dataset. We divide countries into five groups:
Country group Countries
Core countries within the Eurozone and the EU (Inner Core) The results reported in Table 1 reveal that the Inner Core countries are subject to a tendency towards under-consumption as the coefficients on the constant term, which represents autonomous growth, are negative or insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, the coefficients on the variable β1, which represents the dependency on EU growth, are positive and highly significant.
For Finland and Germany the coefficients are greater than 1, which indicates that for each percentage point increase in the EU growth rate, their growth rate increases by more than a percentage point. Therefore, their gain from EU growth through exports, and in other ways, has offset the tendency towards secular stagnation to which their economies are prone. The Core is indeed dependent on the Periphery.
The coefficients on the crisis dummy are on the whole positive although only statistically significant for Germany, which shows that the Core countries have not been significantly affected by the crisis, or have even benefitted from it (for example through domestic stimulus measures).
Only one of the regressions (Germany) shows signs of autocorrelation (the Breusch-Pagan test is significant at the 10% level), which could introduce difficulties in interpreting the t-statistics. Growth dependency, indicated by coefficient β1 is also positive, except in the case of Greece, and in several countries greater than 1 (Ireland, Italy and Slovenia). Unlike the Core countries, the negative coefficients on β1, the crisis dummy, are uniformly negative, and not surprisingly extremely high in the case of Greece. Autocorrelation appears as a problem in the regressions for Cyprus (BreuschPagan test significant at 5% level) suggesting that the standard errors for these may be over-estimated. The coefficient even exceeds a value of 2 for the Baltic countries. Among the outer periphery group, the two SEE countries, Bulgaria and Romania, show strong autonomous growth potential (high coefficients on β0) whereas in relation to growth dependency the values of the β1 coefficient are less than 1, suggesting a weak dependency and a lesser gain from EU economic relations than for the other countries in the group. Both countries have experienced a severe adverse impact of the eurozone crisis. Table 5 shows results for the Super Periphery group of countries. Most regressions for this group indicate very strong autonomous growth potentials with the coefficients of the constant term having a high level of statistical significance in the cases of Albania and Croatia. This implies that even in the absence of EU membership the countries could achieve a high rate of economic growth under the rights conditions. There is clearly a large potential for catchup growth in this group.
The dependency of Super Periphery countries on the EU growth is weak, with only no countries having a coefficient on β1 greater than unity. Only Croatia has a statistically significant positive coefficient. The low coefficients on β1 suggest that the Super Periphery is not dependent on the Core. Hence, catchup growth in the Super Periphery could be "autonomous" and could feasibly be generated by internal demand and exports to other countries within the region and elsewhere in the world.
The crisis effects in the super-periphery are uniformly negative and large with the exception of Macedonia, as shown by the coefficients on β2. Interestingly, Macedonia is the only country in the region where unemployment rates have fallen during the crisis, in part due to successful macroeconomic policies and to a successful attempt to attract foreign investors into low-tax industrial and technology zones. The DW statistic is above the lower bound for all countries in this group. To deal with the problem of possible autocorrelation in Cyprus and Germany, the relevant regressions were re-estimated using the robust standard errors procedure within STATA. The results are presented in Table 5 . Here, as above, β1 is the coefficient on current growth rate in the EU, β2 is the coefficient on the crisis dummy variable. While the values of the coefficients remain the same the significance level of the estimates is improved. However, this has made little difference in practice, with only a reduction in the significance level for β1 for Cyprus from 5% to 10% level. Table 6 summarises the results of the analysis by country group, which shows average values of the estimated coefficients for each group of countries. It can be seen that the autonomous growth coefficient β0 differs by country group, being negative for the Inner Core countries. This indicates that the Inner Core countries may be suffering from secular stagnation and under-consumption that is relieved by the export demand coming from the Inner, Outer and Super Peripheries. The mean value of this coefficient is progressively higher for the Inner Periphery, followed by the Outer Periphery and then the Super Periphery where it reaches a value of 3.3. This indicates that the more peripheral a country is to the Eurozone, the greater is the autonomous growth component, and the greater potential for catching up. The data is presented in Figure 3 , showing clearly the differences between the country groups. Table 6 )
The average of the coefficient β1, which reflects the degree to which individual country growth rates are dependent upon the growth rate of the EU, also differs between groups of countries. The Core countries (both Inner and Outer) have a mean value of this coefficient that is greater than unity. This implies that for each 1 percentage point increase in EU growth, the Core countries experience a more than 1 percentage point increase in their own growth rate (on average). The implication is that the Core countries benefit more than proportionately from EU growth, and this offsets to some extent at least their propensity to negative or low autonomous growth. The Inner, Outer and Super Peripheries have relatively low coefficients of dependency on the EU.
The mean value of this coefficient is less than 1 for each group, and becomes progressively lower as one moves from the inner Periphery to the Super Periphery. This implies that each 1% growth of the EU has a less than 1% impact on growth in countries within the Periphery.
Turning to the crisis effects, the greatest effect is seen in the Inner Periphery and the Super Periphery, with the greatest impact in the latter countries. The b (1) b (2) Outer Periphery has been affected by the crisis but to a slightly lesser extent.
The Core group of countries have actually gained from the crisis in terms of growth effects, compared to the non-crisis years. This may be due to the fact that they have not had to endure austerity policies, and to the stimulus policies that were applied initially in the Core group.
The final column in Table 6 However, fiscal consolidation associated with these austerity policies is likely to reduce domestic demand and undermine growth, offsetting many of the benefits of increased competitiveness.
Despite the rhetoric of austerity and structural reform, the Core countries have practiced the opposite. Germany comes 28th out of 34 countries ranked by OECD for reform progress since onset of crisis. In early stage of crisis, an anticrisis measure to subsidise new car purchases was adopted. More recently Germany has introduced policies that have cut the pension age to 63, or even 61 in certain cases, increased minimum wages to relatively high levels, and introduced industrial subsidies for green energy producers through the Energiewende (Energy change) programme that provides massive subsidies to renewable energy producers.
Conclusions
This In the 2000s, the process of financialisation stimulated and supported an artificial economic boom in the Periphery. Indeed, financialisation was also a product of the tendency towards secular stagnation, as the provision of consumer credit was an important way in which the Core countries were able to stimulate demand and overcome under-consumption tendencies. The phenomenon of financialisation has also spread to the peripheries, making them vulnerable to the additional financial effects of crisis.
The combination of a theory of Core-Periphery and a theory of underconsumption provides an explanation of the dependency relationships between the European economies and of the spillover effects of Eurozone crisis to the Western Balkans. Continuing austerity as a method to create internal devaluation in the Periphery is unlikely to succeed as a means to extricate these countries from crisis. Due to their lack of competitiveness, a process of export led growth is an unlikely outcome. Given the dependencies of the European economies upon one another, a possibly better way out of the current period of low growth and stagnation would be a coordinated fiscal expansion to stimulate domestic and Europe-wide demand, led by a Europewide investment programme focused on renewing the infrastructure assets in the Periphery that could be funded by the European Investment Bank.
